Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
College of Education Faculty Research and
Publications

Education, College of

1-1-2013

The Price of Human Capital: The Illusion of Equal
Educational Opportunity
Harvey Kantor
University of Utah

Robert Lowe
Marquette University, robert.lowe@marquette.edu

Published version. "The Price of Human Capital: The Illusion of Equal Educational Opportunity," in
Public Education Under Siege. Eds. Michael B. Katz and Mike Rose. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013: 75-83. Publisher Link. © 2013 University of Pennsylvania Press. Used
with permission.

7
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In his oft-quoted Fifth Report to the Massachusetts Board of Education, Horace Mann sought to popularize the idea that education had individual as well
as collective economic benefits. This 1841 report became one of the most well
known of Mann's twelve reports to the board, though Mann himself worried
that such an appeal would exacerbate the materialism that he hoped the common schools would combat. At the time, however, the Massachusetts Board
was under attack from opponents of a centralized school system, and Mann
thought that by showing how schooling benefited the economy he might
convince the board's opponents of the value of the state's investment in public
education. Accordingly, he replaced his usual arguments about its moral and
civic value with a demonstration of its monetary value to both workers and
manufacturers in the Commonwealth. Arguing that the key to prosperity
was an educated populace, he even sought to calculate the rate of return to
the state's investment in education by asking a small sample of Massachusetts
businessmen to assess the difference in productivity between literate and illiterate workers.
Though Mann's argument about economic efficacy helped save the Board
of Education, until the end of the nineteenth century most common-school
promoters continued to prioritize the civic and moral purposes of education.
Since then, however, those ideas have been eclipsed by ones like those Mann
articulated in his Fifth Report, particularly about the school's role in the production of what we now call human capital. Arguments about the school's
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civic and moral purposes have not disappeared, of course. They appear regularly on political leaders' lists of desirable educational goals. But over the last
hundred years those ideas have been increasingly subordinated to the notion
that the primary purpose of education is to equip students with the skills they
presumably need to improve their own economic opportunities and to make
the nation more prosperous and secure.
Nowhere has the influence of this way of thinking about education been
more evident than in the history of federal education policy. It is especially evident today, for example, in programs like President Barack Obama's Race to the
Top Fund, which explicitly links federal aid to his desire to restore the nation's
competitive edge in the international marketplace. But the influence of ideas
about human capital formation on federal education policy began nearly a century ago when they provided the chief justification for passage of the SmithHughes Vocational Education Act in 1917. And they have provided the main
rationale for nearly all the federal government's most important educational
initiatives ever since-including the National Defense Education Act (NDEA)
in 1958, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965, and,
most recently, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001. Indeed, given the
longstanding opposition to federal involvement in education, it's hard to imagine that these programs could have passed on any other terms.
Taken together, these initiatives helped justify the expansion of elementary and secondary education to working-class youth, immigrants, women,
and people of color as well. As a result, the public high school today is more
inclusive than it was at the end of the nineteenth century when it graduated
only 3 percent of the eligible age group. Yet, if the programs spawned by the
federal interest in developing human capital contributed to the democratization of secondary schools, they have also had less desirable consequences.
They seldom provided the economic benefits their proponents promised, but
operated instead to displace economic anxieties onto the schools, deflecting
attention from the need for more assertive labor market polices. At the same
time, they protected the educational advantages of the nation's most affluent
and privileged citizens. This is true even though the conception of equal opportunity that has informed them has actually grown more robust over time
as policy has shifted from a focus on teaching specific vocational skills to
working-class and immigrant youth to a focus on equipping all studentsrich and poor alike-with the cognitive skills that a more fluid, knowledgebased economy presumably requires.
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Consider, for example, the movement for vocational education that culminated with the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act, the first major program
of federal assistance to public education. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, no other reform attracted such a broad spectrum of supporters
or generated such high expectations for success. Business executives, labor
unions, social reformers, as well as many educators all argued that vocational
training in schools, particularly trade and industrial education, would be an
antidote to poverty, youth unemployment, and the threat of national economic decline. Yet even allowing for the rhetorical oversell that usually accompanies new programs, the payoff to investment in vocational education
fell far short of what proponents assumed it would be. Not only did graduates seldom find jobs in the areas for which they had been trained, but most
evaluations of vocational programs found that on average their graduates
earned no more than graduates from the regular course of study. Indeed,
most evaluations concluded that vocational education functioned mainly, in
the words of one 1938 report, as a "dumping ground" for working-class and
immigrant youth who had been pushed out of the labor market and pulled
into school by tougher enforcement of child labor and compulsory education
laws but whom educators did not think were capable of doing more advanced
academic work.
It is important not to overstate these failures. Some young people did
benefit from vocational education. Yet even in cases where it helped them get
jobs, it ultimately did as much to harden as to reduce class and racial disparities in schools and in the labor market. Commercial education courses, for
example, provided working- and middle-class young women a path out of
domesticity into paid labor, and, in some cities, trade and technical schools
provided a small number of immigrant and working-class boys with access
to the more privileged sectors of the blue-collar work force, where technical skills were highly valued. That, however, is also why vocational educators
typically excluded African American and Latino youth. They were channeled
into courses in the "trowel trades" and domestic work or, as they began to
attend high school in greater numbers, placed in the general education track
that prepared them for neither work nor college.
Theoretically, of course, school officials and political leaders could have
adopted policies that expanded access to the labor market by encouraging all
students to enroll in courses that would prepare them for college, even if they
were unlikely to go beyond high school. That was what the National Education
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Association Committee of Ten had recommended in 1893 and what some
policy makers recommend today. But at the turn of the century most educators rejected this idea. They believed it was inefficient and undemocratic
because it didn't help students adjust to the demands of society and denied
those headed for working-class jobs the same opportunity to prepare for
their likely future occupations that the academic curriculum had long offered
to middle-class youth bound for college and the professions. Once we recognize that the academic course of study was becoming more tightly linked
to the most desirable jobs, however, the assumption that working-class students were more suited for vocational than academic study appears less as
an expression of democracy than as a way for a relatively elite population to
preserve access to college and subsequently to managerial and professional
positions-at a time when students from poor and working-class families
pressed for access of their own.
Partly for these reasons, vocational education fell out of favor. But the
assumptions about human capital formation that informed it continued to
shape educational policy long after enthusiasm for it had dimmed. Following
the Second World War, for example, the Cold War inspired a shift in policy
interest from preparing working-class young people for working-class jobs
to providing equal opportunity for the development of high-level technical
skills to counter the threat of Soviet technical superiority. A concern with national security, heightened by the launching of Sputnik, made it possible for
many members of Congress to overcome their fear that federal involvement
in education would erode the power of local school boards, thereby paving
the way for the passage of the NDEA in 1958. "The present emergency:' it
declared, "demands that additional and more adequate educational opportunities be made available:' Nonetheless, although its investment in support
for mathematics, science, and foreign language instruction provided some financial heft to efforts already in place, the NDEA did little to create a serious
intellectual experience for the vast majority of high school students. Its main
concern was "to identify and educate more of the talent of our Nation:' Consequently, it invested in both testing to determine who had the most talent
and in guidance that would direct those students to challenging coursesand to college.
This agenda meshed perfectly with the proposals ofJames Bryant Conant's
highly influential The American High School Today (1959). Published a year
after Congress passed the NDEA, its affirmation of the comprehensive high
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school served as a blueprint for school districts across the country. Although
Conant believed that all students needed a core of academic subjects, he
maintained that there should be ability grouping and then a high-level academic track for the top 15 percent and a vocational track for those deemed
to have limited academic talent. In harmony with the spirit ofNDEA, he was
committed to a broader view of equality of opportunity than earlier advocates of vocational education. He wanted to ensure that students who had
high scores on aptitude tests did not choose the vocational track and that
schools did not succumb to the pressure of affluent parents to place modestly
talented students in a curriculum that was too advanced for them. This idea
of equality as meritocracy made it possible, to use Thomas Jefferson's phrase,
to rake some diamonds from the rubbish, enabling some outstanding students from disadvantaged backgrounds to get superior educations. Neither
NDEA nor Conant, however, had anything to say about how socioeconomic
differences produced test-score inequalities that were then reproduced by
placement in the different tracks of the comprehensive high school.
The Cold War not only inspired the development of human capital to
compete with the Soviet Union scientifically, but also inspired a concern to
improve the image of American democracy in competition with the Soviet
Union for the loyalties of people in Africa, Asia, and South America. The
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) satisfied this
ideological concern by appearing to demonstrate that American democracy
would no longer tolerate racial segregation. NDEA, however, paid no attention to matters of racial inequality. In fact, it passed only because proponents allayed the fears of Southern Congress members that greater federal
involvement in education would lead to interference with their segregated
institutions.
In contrast to the meritocratic emphasis of NDEA, which actually reinforced race and class inequalities in education, federal policy since 1960,
beginning with Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, has tried to address these inequalities. Inspired by the civil rights
movement, Title I signaled a shift from the international focus of the Cold
War to a domestic focus on poverty-the realm Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel called our "nearest foreign country:' In introducing the
legislation that became the centerpiece of the Great Society and the war on
poverty, President Lyndon Johnson stated, "Poverty has many roots, but the
taproot is ignorance:' The solution was to provide funding to schools with
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concentrations of the poor in order to "contribute particularly to meeting
the special needs of educationally deprived children:' In this way the poor
would be able to accumulate the human capital necessary to find employment, which would enable them to escape from poverty.
In addition to distracting attention from the ways labor market inadequacies contributed to poverty, there were two major problems with Title 1. First,
despite an initial investment of slightly more than one billion dollars, the political viability of the program depended on the wide distribution of its funds.
As a result, more than nine in every ten school districts ultimately shared the
money, making it impossible to concentrate significant resources in the schools
and districts with the largest number of poor students. Second, the practice of
Title I was governed by the conviction that poor children, especially if they
were African American or Latino, were hampered in school because they had
cultural deficits that required compensatory education. Although Title I did
not specify interventions, the typical practice emphasized pullout programs
that focused on low-level skills to make up for what students presumably
lacked-and this required them to miss regular classroom instruction.
These limitations became evident once evaluations were conducted. Early
on, most of these evaluations found few positive effects. Some studies even
found that the achievement of students in the program declined, though this
was partly because of the wide dispersal of funding. Later evaluations, conducted once funds were better targeted to the students they were intended to
help, were somewhat more encouraging, but they still paled in comparison to
the program's original promise to help poor children escape from poverty. By
the early 1980s, most concluded that the major benefit of the program was to
keep the achievement gap between rich and poor students from getting worse.
Only modestly redistributive and built on the assumption that poor children were deficient rather than that schools were organized to hinder their
capacity, Title I was a poor substitute for the more capacious view of equality
of educational opportunity that integration promised. But because it distributed its funds so widely, it generated a broad constituency of support from
new groups of service providers and recipients, both Republicans and Democrats in Congress, and education interest groups like the National Education
Association, which rallied to defend the program whenever it was attacked.
As a result, Title I turned out to be remarkably resilient, despite its relatively
slight impact on student achievement. It survived Ronald Reagan's attempt to
turn it into a block grant in 1981, and it continues to be the chief mechanism
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distributing federal dollars to the schools, which it does according to the
premises put in place in 1965.
Whereas Title I was motivated by a desire to use education to help chilfrom low-income families escape what Lyndon Johnson referred to as
the "cycle of poverty:' the movement that culminated with the passage of the
NCLB in 200l had little to do with fighting poverty. It was motivated instead
a desire to upgrade the quality of the nation's labor force and thereby increase the capacity of its businesses to compete in the international marketplace. But as with the Great Society's poverty warriors, the businesspeople,
politicians, educators, and other social reformers who fretted about the nation's lagging economic performance never questioned the idea that the solution to the problems they faced lay primarily with strategies of educational
reform aimed at the development of human capital.
At the outset, NCLB did appear to embrace a more robust vision of equal
opportunity than Title I of ESEA. Rather than trying to change the character
oflow-income children, as Title I seemed interested in doing, NCLB aimed
to change the schools. By providing test score data to compare schools with
students from different backgrounds and sanctioning those that did not bring
all groups up to a minimum standard of academic achievement, NCLB countered the idea that low-income children and children of color were somehow
incapable of achieving. Instead, it promised to offer proof that schools and
educational practices, not children and their parents, were to blame for racially and economically disparate outcomes. It then promised to press inadequate schools to address those disparities.
But this vision of reform was even more pinched than the preceding one.
It rightly rejected the array of stigmatizing practices that accompanied earlier compensatory programs and that had long depressed the educational
achievement oflow-income children. In doing so, however, it also minimized
the idea that there was any connection between the conditions of educational provision and school achievement, let alone that equality required the
redistribution of income. By setting uniform standards for all students and
holding local schools accountable for meeting them, it sought instead to discipline teachers and administrators to raise achievement levels regardless of
the often great disparities of resources available in different schools.
Over the last decade, the limits of this strategy have become all too
apparent. Touted as a program to reduce the achievement gap so that all
students would have an equal chance to acquire the academic skills needed in
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the twenty-first-century economy, NCLB was rarely effective. Most often, it
functioned to protect the educational advantages of the most privileged, just
as federal policy has done so often in the past. This time, however, the familiar result didn't come about because educators formally limited access to the
most challenging academic classes or because they isolated poor students in
pullout classrooms. It was because teachers and administrators in low-income
city schools faced the impossible requirement of annual increases in the test
scores of multiple subgroups-including special education students-so that
all of them attained the same level of proficiency. In order to meet this goal
and avoid the NCLB's penalties for failure, these educators focused narrowly
on preparation for the tests in reading and mathematics at the expense of other
subjects. In contrast, their counterparts in middle-class suburban schools, confident that their students could succeed on the tests without special preparation, continued to offer an enriched curriculum. In this way, the disaggregation
of test scores by subgroup, which was the legislation's most progressive feature,
actually worked to produce less than progressive results.
Though the rhetoric around NCLB was all about eliminating the achievement gap between rich and poor, any program that directly attacked the
sources of the educational advantages of affluent over poor children was unlikely to have won political support. As a result, NCLB focused on saving the
children in urban schools while leaving the district lines that protected the
suburban schools and their mostly white, middle-class students intact.
None of this long history has done much to dampen enthusiasm among
policy makers today for developing human capital in schools as a way to
solve the economic challenges facing the nation and to equalize educational
opportunity. Economic problems, such as stagnant wages and rising income
inequality, for example, have more to do with the absence of strong labor
market institutions, the adoption of regressive tax policies, and the social
norms that enable vast accumulations of wealth for a few than they do with
the quantity and quality of education students receive. Yet the commitment
to addressing these problems through ostensibly better education policies
not only remains unabated, but, if anything, has been enhanced by the now
commonly held belief that the economy's shortcomings stem from too much
government intervention rather than too little. In this environment, a "supplyside" strategy like human capital formation has particular appeal, even to
many of those who were once skeptical about it.
Some of Obama's supporters hoped he might chart a different course. But
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his vision of education policy has done little to alter these preferences. His
call for the nation to "out-educate" our international competitors continues
to assign to the schools responsibility for solving problems that are beyond
educational correction while the policies he has adopted-such as Race to
the Top-pose no challenge to the jurisdictional arrangements that have long
protected the educational advantages of the affluent. Instead, following the
trajectory set in motion by NCLB, they are confined to the technical problems of how to manage schools better, measure achievement more precisely,
encourage teachers to work harder, and manipulate incentives to stimulate
the growth of charter schools.
No less than when Horace Mann wrote his Fifth Report, Obama's strategy
might be the only way in the current political climate to win backing for
more spending on education. But the history of past policy suggests that we
have paid a steep price for it. We should be thinking instead about how we
might establish conditions both inside and outside the schools that will engage students in the kind of serious intellectual work that the Committee of
Ten called for more than a century ago, rather than pursuing policies that
will only add another dimension of inequality to an already unequal system.

